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Edward Mandell House was for many years a close friend and 
adviser of Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States 1913- 
21. Being a presidential adviser is not an easy job. House, never- 
theless, managed to stay on for nearly two full terms. But in 1918 
he was appointed an official delegate to the Paris Peace Confe- 
rence (Wilson himself headed the American Delegation, the other 
representatives being Secretary of State Robert Lansing, General 
Tasker H. Bliss and Ambassador Henry White) and during that 
Conference a 'break' occurred between the two men. Since then 
an unending debate has been going on in American historiography 
as to why and when this break actually took place. I n  1973 I 
published yet another attempt to solve the problem,l and the 
editor of this journal has kindly asked me to give a summary of my 
book as an example of the study of American history in Scandinavia. 
On the following pages I shall therefore give a historiographical 
survey iollowed by a brief statement of my own findings. 
The reason why the question has attracted so many scholars is 
not only that it presents a fascinating psychological problem but 
also that in the greater perspective the explanation one gives of 
the break has a bearing on the evaluation of the President and his 
policy at the Peace Conferen~e.~ Many interpretations of the break 
have been presented, shifting the 'guilt' alternatively between 
House and Wilson, and seeking the causes either in principles 
and politics or in personalities and psychology, or in a combination 
of both. 
Also the actual dating of the break has been under discussion: 
Did it occur immediately after Wilson's return to Paris (after a 
brief sojourn in the US) in March 19197 or was it the result of a 
gradual development? and if so, when did this process start and 
end? Which again raises another set of questions: Did House actu- 
ally exert any influence on the policy of the American President 
during the critical phase of the Conference ? Who was responsible 
for the series of compromises Wilson had to make in order to 
obtain what he thought was the core of his program, the League 
of Nations? 
The literature on the subject can be roughly classified into three 
main themes on the reasons for the break: 
The first version, which can also be called the 'contemporary' or 
'official' version, was presented by, inter alios, Cary Grayson, 
Wilson's personal physician and friend, and publicly recorded by 
Wilson's biographer, Ray Stannard Baker, in his three-volume work 
on the Conference : Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (1923) . 3  
According to this interpretation, which incidentally -although on 
quite different premises -received the support of Henry Wickham 
Steed,4 editor of The Times and definitely not a member of the 
clique about Wilson, the reasons for the break are primarily to be 
sought in House's conduct during the President's absence from the 
Conference in February-March 1919, and the break itself is given 
as having occurred in the period immediately after Wilson's return 
to Paris in the middle of March. Especially House's policy on the 
problems relating to the Preliminary Peace Treaty and the League 
of Nations is advanced as decisive, together with his conciliatory 
attitude to the French demands for a Rhenish Republic. 
This theory was strongly refuted by House's official biographer, 
Charles Seymour, in his edition of House's diary and letters: The 
Intimate Papers of Colonel House, the fourth volume of which was 
published in 192tL5 Using excerpts from the then still unpublished 
minutes of meetings of the Council of Ten, Seymour repudiated 
the charge that House had acted illoyally to the President in 
February -March 1919. At the same time, however, he admitted 
that House had been more willing to compromise with the Allied 
Powers than even Wilson himself appears to have been. This was, 
in fact, a not unimportant admission on the part of Seymour, be- 
cause another of Baker's lines of argument was that House, by his 
enthusiasm for compromise both during Wilson's absence and after 
his return, had contributed considerably towards undermining the 
position of the President. 
Whereas Baker viewed the Peace Conference from the angle 
'Old' versus 'New Diplomacy,' 'a conflict between the evils of the 
old European diplomatic system and the virtues of the new world 
idealism,' Seymour regarded this as a gross over-simplification: 
'Such a picture is attractive to those who will not try to understand 
the complexities of historical truth. In  reality the Peace Conference 
was not nearly so simple. I t  was not so much a duel as a general 
mClee, in which the representatives of each nation struggled to 
secure endorsement for their particular methods of ensuring: the 
p e a ~ e . ' ~  The methods may have differed, but their aim had been 
the same and, according to Seymour, the American programme too, 
had been 'coloured by self-interest.' 'Our interest lay entirely in 
assuring a regime of world tranquillity; our geographical position 
was such that we could advocate disarmament and arbitration with 
complete safety. Wilson's idealism was in line with a healthy Real- 
politik.' 
Seymour may have hoped in this way to lead the debate into 
new paths;7 if so, he had cause for both satisfaction and disappoint- 
ment. The former, because late research did in fact accept his 
refutation of Baker's thesis that the February -March period had 
been decisive for the break, and the latter, because the next large 
American work on the Peace Conference again made House not 
only the principal, but also the scapegoat. 
Paul Birdsall's Versailles Twenty Years Afters (1941) was a con- 
temporary attack on a generation of disillusioned Liberals and 
'realistic' 'appeasementy-politicians. The book constituted a defense 
of Wilson's firm attitude and an attack on all who had been willing 
to compromise, i.e., first and foremost, House. According to Birdsall, 
House was blameworthy not only for his eagerness to compromise, 
which had undermined Wilson's negotiating position in a number 
of critical situations, but also for his internal manipulations, which 
had split and thus weakened the American Delegation. The 
decisive phase as regards the break had, however, now shifted. 
No longer was it the events during Wilson's absence that were re- 
garded as decisive, but House's conduct during the Italian crisis, 
by which Birdsall considered that he had both split the Delegation 
and undermined Wilson's policy. Even though Birdsall tried to 
avoid personal accusations and to keep the discussion on a theor- 
etical plane, House could not help but appear as the scapegoat par 
excellence, especially as Birdsall's presentation, particularly of the 
Italian crisis, lacked all proportion. 
Seymour, too, advanced a theory on the break between the two 
men: I t  was not a question of an event that could be clearly fixed 
in time, but of a gradual development. This point of view was 
later supported by Thomas A. Bailey9 and can now be regarded as 
generally accepted. At the same time, the research on the question 
has partly taken new roads, although a psychological, or psycholo- 
gistic, approach to the study of Colonel House's career can hardly 
be called new -on the contrary, it was the angle taken quite auto- 
matically by a number of contemporary 'eye-witnesses.'lo All the 
same, the latest contribution within this genre must be characteri- 
zed as epoch-making. Alexander and Juliette L. George's Woodrow 
Wilson and Colonel House. A Personality Study, (1956) is not just 
the result of close cooperation between a political scientist and a 
psychologist, but also the first attempt at a consistent utilization of 
House's voluminous diary in its full, chronological scope.ll How- 
ever, before turning to a detailed analysis of this latest, exhaustive 
contribution to the discussion, it might be wise to study in a little 
more detail the debate on House in general. 
Seymour's edition of House's papers provides a comprehensive 
view of House and his work; a view which later research has dis- 
puted on a number of points, but which did not meet really serious 
opposition until the publication by George and George of their 
thorough analysis of House's diary. And in my opinion, even these 
authors have not taken the matter to its logical conclusion because 
they have still accepted Seymour's evaluation of House in certain 
respects. The first volume of Seymour's book included a preface by 
House himself, in which he stated that the book was in no way a 
conventional apology. However, Seymour, in his subsequent pre- 
face, accepted full scholarly responsibility for the edition and at 
the same time thanked House for his invaluable comments and 
advice, adding, moreover, that '[wlhatever deletions appear in 
the published papers have been dictated by the exigencies of space 
or by a regard to the feelings of persons still alive, and in no case 
do they alter the historical meaning of the papers.' In  another 
context, Seymour expressed his own view of House as follows: 
'. . . Counsellor and Idealist, Wise, Courageous, U n s e l f i ~ h . ' ~ ~  
As source material, the book is very poor. Even its form, 'arsan- 
ged as a narrative,'makes it difficult -and sometimes even imposs- 
ible-to discover when Seymour's comments are his own views, 
when they are paraphrasing omitted parts of the diary, and when 
they are just summarizing the subsequent text. Another serious 
defect is the fact that, for stylistic reasons, Seymour frequently 
omits the date from citations. However, the main point of contro- 
versy is the actual selection, or rather, the omissions. The question 
is whether the selection provided is really representative, and the 
answer is both a yes and a no. The selection is representative in so 
far as it illustrates the most important aspects of Wilsonian policy 
and House's part in this. But even contemporary commentators 
pointed to a tendency to over-estimate House's role here,13 and 
in the light of more recent research it must be emphasized that 
the picture of House as the ever loyal and unselfish adviser drawn 
by Seymour has, to say the least, been given a number of new 
facets. There were certain aspects of House's activities that Sey- 
mour simply omitted or glossed over, aspects that he did not, or 
would not, see. And what is more, there is a definite trend in the 
omissions, the question that Seymour consistently avoided was the 
fundamental one: the problem 01 House's loyalty. 
One of the points on which Seymour's book is not exhaustive 
concerns the conversations between House and the German Ambas- 
sador, Count Bernstorff in a number of critical situations during 
the period of neutrality. I n  1958, Karl E. Birnbaum, working on 
the basis of a telegram from Bernstorff to Auswartiges Amt of 21 
November, 1916, proved, or at any rate showed it to be highly 
likely, that House had not at this time interpreted with complete 
loyalty Wilson's ideas for a peace-move, ideas to which House 
himself had been opposed.14 Birnbaum's demonstration of illoyal 
behavior on the part of House is only one of many produced by 
later historians. I t  is stressed here, however, because it prompted 
a reply, although only an indirect one, by Seymour. I n  the memo- 
rial volume for G. P. Gooch in 1961, he wrote an article on 'The 
House-Bernstorff Conversations in Perspective,' which can hardly 
have been inspired by anyone but Birnbaum.15 What is charac- 
teristic about the article is, however, the fact that Seymour did 
not take up the question of House's loyalty at all, but simply 
wrote roughly the same as he had always written, and with the 
same source refe
r
ences. There were still sides of House that he chose 
to ignore. 
This is not the only time in recent years that Seymour has return- 
ed to the question of House. In  1957, on the occasion of the cente- 
nary of Wilson's birth, he wrote an article, 'The Role of Colonel 
House in Wilson's Diplomacy,' for inclusion in the memorial 
volume, giving in just a few pages a brilliant presentation of his 
evaluation of House's role in Wilson's fo
r
eign policy.16 Using as 
a basis the greatly varying degrees of importance attached over 
the years to House's influence, Seymour presented his own con- 
viction 'that the reaction emphasizing the political importance of 
House is likely to increase in strength,' but that it would at the 
same time become 'discriminatory in character.' I t  would be 
shown that House's influence had been greatest 'in policies relating 
to Western Europe and particularly to the issues raised by the 
war . . . but with certain shadings in emphasis. His service will 
tend to be interpreted as that of diplomatic tactician and executive 
agent rather than as a determining or decisive influence in the 
formation of policy. Wilson's basic principles were by no means 
inspired by the Colonel. . . . He was a political catalyst, an expert 
on method, a purveyor of facts, a stimulus and a corrective.'17 'We 
was not qualified to originate policy, but he was supremely qualified 
to facilitate its execution.' He possessed all the traits that characteri- 
ize 'the finished diplomatist.'ls 
Incidentally, the spheres advanced by Seymour as characteristic 
of House's influence were identical to those he had stressed 30 
years earlier, with a single exception: the negotiations between the 
United States and the Allies prior to the Armistice with Germany. 
Seymour still regarded the result as 'a diplomatic victory of dis- 
tinction,' although he stressed the fact that '. . . House's success 
was not as clear-cut as he imagined and it was not effectively 
capitalized.'lg He blamed Wilson for the latter, but left the 
former, and most interesting, comment untouched. This remark- 
ably clearly drawn portrait of House represented an important 
modification of the far cruder picture painted in Intimate Papers; 
but Seymour stuck to his guns on one point: for him, House 
was still the diplomat par excellence or, as Harold Nicolson 
has put it, 'the best diplomatic brain that America has yet pro- 
duced. . . . '20 
Intimate Papers constitutes the only attempt at a comprehensive, 
political biography of House, but Wilsonian research of recent years 
has naturally also touched upon his closest adviser. And practically 
every author has managed to unearth from the House papers etc. 
details that shake the picture established by Seymour in his Intimate 
Papers. One of the latest analyses of House as a diplomat has been 
provided by Arthur S. Link in the fourth volume of his biography 
of Wilson, in connection with his discussion of the so-called House- 
Grey memorandum, one of the most debated documents of the 
period of n e ~ t r a l i t y . ~ ~  Link's evaluation is one of the hardest judg- 
ments ever made on House. In his negotiations with the European 
statesmen in February 19 16, House 'grossly misrepresented the 
President and misinformed him as well'; in other words, he had 
conducted an independent policy. However, in Link's opinion, not 
only had he behaved in an illoyal manner to Wilson, he had also 
failed as a negotiator: 
House had heard what he wanted to hear in Paris and London. He had deluded 
himself into believing that the British and French wanted American mediation 
for a negotiated peace. I t  did not matter that this was not true, or that the British 
and French leaders had said nothing to indicate that it was either true or possible. 
House was out of touch with reality by the time of his conversations in Paris and 
his return to London. He consequently not only misinformed and misled Presi- 
den Wilson but also encouraged him to base fundamental foreign policy on the 
assumption that American mediation was possible in the immediate future.2z 
There is thus not much left of House the diplomat. 
Nevertheless, a number of problems still remain because House 
possessed, to an unusual degree, the ability of being 'all things to 
all men.' Just as we think we have grasped the 'essence' of the man, 
the image crumbles away, only to reappear in a new form, and this 
is really also the case with Link's portrait. As House appears in the 
above passages, he must be regarded as a man with an obsession, 
as the naive amateur in the hands of cynical professionals. However, 
there are other aspects of House's time in Europe that present him 
in quite a different light: as the man able to make a cool and 
realistic analysis of a political situation and draw the relevant con- 
clusions. One example of this has been pointed out by Link him- 
self. House spent three days in Berlin and at once apprehended the 
entire situation: the fight between the civilian and the military 
leaders, and the increasingly precarious position of the former, 
which could be completely upset by too harsh American demands. 
He explained this situation in lucid detail in a letter to the President, 
and pointed out the consequences to the political constellation in 
Germany of a severe American course in the renewed Lusitania- 
negotiations. And this letter persuaded Wilson to withdraw forth- 
with the support he had hitherto given to the hard line followed 
by the Secretary of State, Robert Lansing: 
I t  was as if Wilson had seen a great light. For the first time he understood what 
Gerard (the American Ambassador in Berlin) had failed to make clear, or even 
to mention-that severe demands might well tip the balance in Germany against 
the Chancellor and set engines in fatal motion under the seasz3 
The objection can be made that Link's approach is very narrow, 
being too closely tied to the direct statements of his sources, and it 
is therefore hardly surprising that other authors, who have ap- 
proached the matter from different angles, have arrived at more fin- 
ely shaded evaluations of House's behavior during this same visit to 
Europe. I t  is, for example, the wider political perspectives of Hou- 
se's negotiations that have interested Edward H. Buehrig in his 
book, Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power. However, it should 
be noted that Buehrig used only published material in his assessment 
of House's peace mission, i.e. primarily Seymour's selection; had he 
had Link's material at his disposal, he might have arrived at a 
slightly less favorable conclusion. However, it is in any case quite 
different sides of the matter that he brings to light than Link. The 
important thing for Buehrig is not so much the actual events as their 
significance, and it is thus not really the negotiations themselves but 
the prelude to them, i.e. the preliminary correspondence between 
House and Sir Edward Grey, that interests him. In Buehrig's view, 
a negotiated peace between the contending parties was the solution 
that best accorded with America's interests : 
A bold [American] diplomatic intervention thus held enticing prospects. Yet its 
execution required the United States to be more than an amiable intermediary. 
American power would have to be brought into play, incurring the danger of 
military involvement or, though a lesser evil, loss of prestige . . . Actually, con- 
siderably prior to the President's espousal of an interventionist diplomacy, Col. 
House had grasped its importance. First of all, therefore, we should note those 
moves initiated by House which were designed to hasten the end of the war. 
Although failing of their immediate objective, they had consequences of singular 
i m p o r t a n ~ e . ~ ~  
During his first peace mission in 1915, House advanced the idea 
that 'a second convention' after the actual Peace Conference 
should discuss amendments to international law. Grey had desired 
American participation, also in the Conference itself, and was 
therefore not satisfied, but he used this as a premise for an argu- 
mentation that continued in the subsequent correspondence and, 
during the summer and autumn, led House and Wilson a long way 
along the road to collective security and the League of Nations. 
House's plans thus achieved a far wider perspective than he him- 
self had at first envisaged. It  was thanks to House's peace plans 
that the idea of a League of Nations made its entry in the diplo- 
macy of the war years, even though it perhaps assumed a different 
guise than Grey had originally envisaged. The picture Buehrig 
draws of the negotiations themselves is also extremely favorable, 
but then, of course, it is only based on Seymour, and like Seymour, 
Buehrig takes House seriously, attempts to assess his extremely 
difficult negotiating position and, on this basis, Is astonished that 
anything came out of it at all-and there perhaps he is right. 
Ernest R. May, in The World War and American Isolation 1914 - 
1917, has also paid particular attention to the House-Grey memor- 
andum, giving his chapter on the subject the very telling title, 
'Wilson's Threats of Mediation.' May has used the House diary 
and the House-Wilson correspondence, but unlike Link, he has 
concentrated not on whether House interpreted Wilson correctly 
on this or that occasion, but rather, on the situation itself. Whereas, 
to Link, it looked as though House had lost all touch with reality, 
May has a different conception of the situation: As soon as House 
came to England, he realized, through his talks with British 
politicians that 'the likelihood of Britain's moderating her economic 
war had become remote, and future friction was almost certain. 
The Colonel, who had felt theretofore that his plan might be de- 
veloped slowly, changed his mind. He began to think it urgent that 
an agreement be reached whereby Wilson could safely demand 
peace.'25 And it was this feeling of urgency that thereafter deter- 
mined House's actions. 
However, there can be no doubt that Link has made a very vital 
point in his clear establishment of House's complete over-estimation 
of the importance of the House-Grey memorandum. His assess- 
ment of House is fully supported by one of the latest and most 
independent contributions to the discussion: Victor S. Mamatey's 
brief but precise characterization in The United States and East 
Central Europe 1914-1918.26 Against the portrait given by both 
Seymour and later, George and George, of a man who worried 
himself about the smallest detail, a consummate technician, Ma- 
matey sets 'a happy extrovert,' a man bored by detail, who is only 
interested in the grand design, the general picture; a man who 
prefers to gather his information from talks rather than from 
studies and who is therefore always well-informed on the very 
latest events, but whose information is, on the other hand, often 
one-sided; in fact, a superficial and intellectually indolent man. 
To George and George, the break between House and Wilson 
at the Peace Conference was primarily psychologically conditioned, 
while Birdsall seems to have considered it mainly as the result of a 
fundamental difference in the two men's conception of the method 
-and partly also the aim-of the negotiations. Mamatey, on the 
other hand, takes a different view: 
During the war when issues were of necessity broad and when technical questions 
could be postponed, House's counsels were generally wise and perspicacious. 
During the armistice negotiations and the Peace Conference, however, when 
questions inevitably became highly complex and technical, he found himself 
out of his depth and his effectiveness as a negotiator declined. The President 
then lost confidence in his judgment, and their relations co0led.~7 
I n  other words, House had simply been inadequate. 
We can thus in no way say that the debate on House is at an 
end, but simply ascertain that the varying assessments have de- 
pended not only on the different approaches of the authors to their 
subject, but also on the nature of the source material at their dispo- 
sal. What has primarily made House a key figure in the historio- 
graphy of the Wilson period is the simple fact that we have here 
not only a man who held a central position in the decision-making 
processes, but also one who kept an exceedingly voluminous diary. 
This diary is one of the most important sources of information on 
the political history of the period, but the question is how far we 
can permit ourselves to trust its testimony. This is really not a 
question to which there is a universal answer, but one to which 
each researcher must find the answer that is compatible with his 
own ego, his material and his conscience, from one situation to 
another. This, however, is not a unique state of affairs, but simply 
the common lot of the historian. 
The first to be confronted with the problem was Charles Sey- 
mour, publisher of the diary, and he solved it in the simplest way 
imaginable : 
Through Miss Denton [Francis B. Denton, House's secretary] was made possible 
the diary which forms the heart of the entire collection of papers. Every evening, 
with rare exceptions and during eight years, Col. House dictated to her his 
resum6 of the day. Definitely and objectively he related his conoersations with, often 
the very words of, his political associates, and he was associated with the men 
who made the history of the decade. The result is a journal of more than two 
thousand pages, a record drafted at the moment and with a frankness which 
suggests that it was not designed for publication. I t  was the Colonel's comments on 
men and events, opinions which he sometimes changed, prophecies which upon 
occasion were fulfilled, a personal document such as the biographer dreams of 
and seldom  discover^.^^ 
Put in another way, Seymour took House at his word, indeed in 
some places he even went so far that, as he himself admits, he came 
to see the events with House's eyes, or perhaps we should say, as 
House wished them to be seen. 
In  the passage quoted above, the first italicized statement is the 
most astonishing at first glance, not only because it discloses an 
exceedingly simple and unsophisticated attitude to the source 
material, but also because it follows immediately upon Seymour's 
explanation of the way in which the diary was written; a process 
that shows how easily unintentional inaccuracies could have crept 
in. The 'intimate' character of the diary is, moreover, shown here 
in quite another light. While Seymour did not consider that the 
diary was intended for publication, Mamatey takes quite a different 
view : 'His diary, incidentally, is not an intimate, personal one, as 
is commonly supposed, but one written for future publication. He 
frequently addresses himself in it to the future reader. . . .'29 And 
this view is directly substantiated by House's own statements in 
the diary. I t  was, quite simply, written to ensure that posterity 
received what House considered to be the correct conception of 
his political importance. However, this was not its only purpose; 
it also functioned as a kind of safety valve for the frustrations in- 
herent in such a delicate position as that held by House, and it 
undoubtedly had a salutary psychological function: the pleasure 
and satisfaction of dwelling upon his own achievements. On the 
other hand, there is one obvious function that the diary does not 
seem to have had: it did not apparently serve as an aide-memoire 
for House when he had to formulate his policy in any given situ- 
ation. On the contrary, House was very careful to make it clear 
that when a suitable section of the diary had been written, it was 
locked away and not taken out again. Thus, as it was not intended 
as a tool, it does not contain analyses of situations or problems. 
Nor, incidentally, do House's other papers. That was apparently 
not the way he worked.30 
A valuable contribution to the illumination of the problems sur- 
rounding the diary has been made by Alexander and Juliette L. 
George. This work is an attempt at  a psychological motivation 
study of Wilson,31 and House is discussed primarily because the 
authors consider that the relationship between the two men illu- 
strates important aspects of Wilson's motives. The method adopted 
by the authors is that of applying a psychological conceptual ap- 
paratus to the course of events already established in the usual 
historical accounts; the book is 'largely a synthesis of facts assembled 
by previous writers.'32 I t  is thus not as a politico-historical but as 
a psychological study that the book can claim originality. As 
regards the House diary, the authors have made an exception in 
that they have gone straight to the source and have thereby 
managed, on the basis of hitherto largely unpublished passages, to 
achieve their greatest 'coup' from an historian's point of view. 
House and Wilson met for the first time in November 191 1. At 
that time, Wilson was Governor of New Jersey and was actively 
engaged in efforts to win the Democratic nomination for the Presi- 
dency. House, who was financially independent, had previously 
acted as adviser to various Texas Governors and had a certain 
standing in the Democratic party on a national level. He had always 
consistently refused all official posts, which gave him the reputation 
of being unselfish and disinterested. However, his pleasure in 
manipulating people and events was obvious.33 The first meeting 
soon led to others, and the casual acquaintanceship gradually 
developed into a more intimate friendship, and for long periods 
of time, House was Wilson's only confidante. The credit for eluci- 
dating the 'mechanism' of this friendship is due to George and 
George. They have succeeded in showing that the friendship was, 
to a high degree, deliberate on House's side and that he cultivated 
it by 'handling' Wilson in a particular way. House had analysed 
Wilson's need for security, encouragement and flattery and was 
willing to fulfil it. On the other hand, however, House's admiration 
and enthusiasm for the President were genuine enough-at any 
rate in the beginning. 
Nonetheless, it is of decisive importance that George and George 
have been able to prove by their analysis of the entries in House's 
diary that these indicated as early as 1913 that House felt a certain 
irritation over Wilson, an irritation that grew stronger as time went 
by. This was accentuated after Wilson's wedding in December 
1915 and increased in step with the growing tension between House 
and the new Mrs. Wilson.34 This irritation on the part of House 
finds expression in a number of critical comments in the diary, both 
as regards Wilson himself and as regards his policies, accompanied 
by accounts of what House himself would have done in Wilson's 
place : 
The frustrations of House's position were increased by the advent of the second 
Mrs. Wilson. Whether and to what extent this added tension accounts for it, the 
fact is that after the marriage the Colonel had much more to say in criticism 
of the President in his diary.35 
The question is whether House's increasing coolness towards the 
President was purely psychologically conditioned, or whether 
there were also real differences of a political nature. And, in the 
latter event, whether they were of a fundamental character - 
whether there was a consistent line or whether they were just 
ordinary disagreements from one case to another. The two authors 
have not provided a clearcut answer to these questions, simply 
noting from time to time that there was discord, without analysing 
its character in detail. However, it is in fact possible to prove that 
fundamental political differences did develop between the two men 
during the course of the war, but the break cannot, on the other 
hand, be attributed to them. 
The new ground opened by George and George's analysis is 
thus their explanation of the deterioration of the friendship and 
of its frail psychological foundation. And in my opinion, this result 
is unassailable. However, there may be good reason for discussing 
the two authors' assessment of House and thus also their use of the 
diary. The picture drawn of the friendship by George and George 
has been based on an analysis of the diary and the House-Wilson 
correspondence, and the obvious discrepancy between House's 
utterances in these is an important and indisputable link in their 
line of reasoning. But the authors have been far too influenced by the 
diary and by ~eymour's account. Like Seymour, they take House 
at his word, and they do not seem anywhere to have considered the 
motives behind the framing of this grandiose monument, but almost 
to have accepted Seymour's i n t e rp r e t a t i ~n ,~~  which is, as we have 
seen, one-sided to say the least of it. 
That the authors have neglected these problems is naturally 
related to the Iact that the 'hero' of the book is quite definitely 
Wilson, and that their interest is psychological. However, it also 
has something to do with the method of the book, primarily, that 
the interpretations are made on the basis of established facts, i.e. 
on an existing selection, the aim of which thus tends to determine 
the conclusions of the new synthesis. All the same, the decisive 
point is that the two authors have managed, through their studies 
of the diary, to raise fundamental doubt as to the representativeness 
of Seymour's selection. Other authors have, of course, also done 
this, both before and since, but whereas the doubts previously 
raised related to interpretations of individual instances, which 
could admittedly, have been pieced together to indicate a certain 
trend, George and George have illustrated a ruthlessly consistent 
omission of anything that might touch upon the question of loyalty. 
In  fact, after this, the Seymour House edition can no longer be 
used, either as source material or as a biography, because his 
evaluation of House is based on a selection of material in which 
we can no longer have any faith. The authors themselves seem to be 
unaware of the problems they have raised, or at any rate, they 
have not taken the obvious consequences of their findings. For them, 
Seymour is still the main source for their political assessment of 
House, but this means that their House portrait disintegrates, which 
in turn affects their entire interpretation of the break between 
House and Wilson. 
These weaknesses already make their appearance in the two 
authors' evaluation of House as a diplomat. An introductory 
characterization places House among the so-called realists, in line 
with the views held by a branch of the latest re~earch.~'  The 
authors themselves cite the works of Edward H. Buehrig and 
Robert E. O ~ g o o d , ~ ~  as well as the Seymour version of House, but 
it must be remembered that neither Buehrig nor Osgood used 
anything but published material in their evaluations of House - 
indeed, Buehrig used mainly Seymour. Later, the authors modify 
their views somewhat: 'House's own approach to international 
affairs, unusual in his day and since, was in many respects a syn- 
thesis of both realist and idealist views of world policies,'39 and 
thereby leave the door open for a discussion of their evaluation of 
House. George and George are fully aware of this dis~usssion,4~ 
but they nevertheless assess House's role in the formulation of 
Wilson's neutrality policy as follows : 
I t  was all the more fortunate, therefore, that his [Wilson's] closest adviser-his 
alter ego, as he sometimes called him-was thoroughly at ease in the setting 
of the realist philosophy of international relations. I t  became Colonel House's 
task to interpret events from this standpoint and to initiate, and prepare the 
ground for, some of the most important foreign policy projects which Wilson 
undertook in response to the European ~onfIict.~l 
Perhaps this rather superficial interpretation also derives from the 
fact that Arthur S. Link, in his Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive , 
Era, could only in one instance prove that House had not provided 
Wilson with a completely loyal account of his  negotiation^.^^ How- 
ever, this presents yet another example of the serious weakness in 
the method applied by the authors: they depend too much on 
the conclusions of others. What makes this particularly grave is 
the fact that Link, as seen in the fourth volume of his biography, 
has since had to revise his views considerably. Consequently, the 
authors' characterization of Honse's attempts to mediate must also 
be regarded as out-of-date : 
If House's peace efforts failed, they did so perhaps more by reason of circumstan- 
ces over which he had no control rather than because of any want of skill on his 
part. Indeed, he had displayed a distinguished talent for exploring passionate 
questions dispassionately and for bringing divergent views to their closest point 
of approximation. That there remained a gap which no diplomatic legerdemain 
could bridge is no reflection upon his ability as a n e g ~ t i a t o r . ~ ~  
The authors' analysis of House as a negotiator is based exclusively 
on the material furnished by Charles Seymour in the first and 
second volumes of his House edition. And the picture that appears 
is hardly surprising; it is a portrait of the eminent tactician and 
organizer, who carefully acquainted himself with even the slightest 
details, so that he completely mastered all the circumstances of a 
negotiation. The man who understood and foresaw every situation, 
and who analysed his opponent's assumptions and psyche in ad- 
vance and marshalled his arguments accordingly. In  short, the 
picture that presented itself to Seymour's admiring eye, and the 
picture House wished to paint of himself. Not until the next chapter 
and in another context, do the authors provide the following sig- 
nificant supplement to their characterization, on the basis of their 
own studies of the diary: 
There can be no question that at the zenith of his career, House exercised tre- 
mendous influence upon the course of diplomatic negotiations. Making the fullest 
allowance for his actual (and extraordinary) power, however, one suspects that 
he had the capacity for exaggerating the importance of his own role in inter- 
national affairs. A master of flattery himself, he seems to have been naively 
susceptible to the compliments of foreign diplomats, whose expressions of 
esteem, it seems safe to assume, were not always entirely artless. . . . He recorded 
in his diary literally hundreds of such expressions of esteem, and it is interesting 
to note that he had the highest estimate of the abilities of the authors of some 
of the most glowing ones. Such intoxicating praise made it easy for House to 
forget that his power derived exclusively from his association with Wilson. 
House seems to have come to believe that the Allied statesmen sought him out 
for his own capabilities rather than as a spokesman for another and, in his view, 
less informed man.44 
We meet this same confused attitude to House again in the chapter 
on the break. After reading this, we are left with a number of un- 
answered questions: What really happened? Who was to blame, 
House or Wilson? What was the reason, Wilson's jealousy or 
House's persistance, or perhaps something quite different? 
In  an earlier chapter, the authors sketch House's state of mind 
at  the end of the war and at the beginning of the Conference, as 
it appears from the entries in his diary: 'coldly realistic about the 
President's short-comings'; 'resentful of his own subordinate role 
in policy-making'; 'thinking that European statesmen sought his 
advice for its own sake' ; 'prey to gradiose notions of his own import- 
ance and capacity to influence the foreign policy of the Allied 
nations.' 'To state the matter baldly, House considered that he 
could better negotiate the peace treaty than Wilson. . . . House 
wanted, for once, to act directly, inde~endent ly. '~~ The authors 
might therefore have been expected to base their account of the break 
on the question of House's loyalty, and, to a certain extent, they 
do this, introducing their thesis with a repudiation of all accusations 
(i.e., principally those of Mrs. Wilson and R. S. Baker) against 
House for disloyalty. Here, the authors do not base their arguments 
on independent source studies but on the scholarly debate on the 
subject, and on this foundation, they draw their first conclusions: 
Neither of the accusations against House, therefore, appears to be warranted. 
Both seem to be explanations contrived later for the President's undoubted 
change of attitude toward House during the second half of the Conference. 
How, then is Wilson's perceptible, gradual cooling toward House upon his 
return to Paris to be explained?46 
I consider that the two authors have hereby precluded themselves 
from gaining the full benefit of their own analysis, because, as point- 
ed out above, they overlook the fact that the rejection by later 
researchers of Baker's thesis is based on Seymour's account- 
precisely the account shown by the investigations of George and 
George to provide a not very credible picture of House. Therefore, 
the only thing the authors gain by neglecting the problem of 
loyalty is that their analysis gets on the wrong track right from the 
beginning. And it is led further astray because they, at the same 
time, and apparently without justification, accept the theory of 
the gradual break. They thereby deconcretize the motives of the two 
men, placing the whole matter on a psychological plane: 
It was an unfortunate combination of circumstances-Wilson's increased sen- 
sitivity to House as a possible competitor and House's overpowering desire to 
'come into his own
y
-that contributed heavily to the gradual waning of the 
President's enthusiasm for his closest colIaborator. No one incident marks the 
end of the friendship between Wilson and House. The relationship was never 
terminated in a clearcut fashion. Rather, Wilson gradually withdrew his 
affection and gradually ceased to consult House.47 
However, this approach also alters the dimensions of the entire 
affair, for if there had really been no conflict of loyalty, the matter 
would be reduced to simply a question of arrogance and jealousy. 
House wanted to be in the limelight; he was tired of playing second 
fiddle, tired of always just agreeing; and Wilson could therefore 
no longer find the satisfaction in the friendship that had previously 
been his-on the contrary, it now increased his anxieties. The 
assumptions thus fail, the whole thing disintegrates, and House 
ends up  as a scapegoat for Wilson's bad conscience. But where then 
is the drama that managed to inflame both contemporaries and 
posterity ? 
Alexander and Juliette George's dissection of House's diary has 
shown that a consistent analysis of the diary is a necessary but 
insufficient basis for an understanding of House's conduct at the 
Peace Conference. What is also needed is a concurrent and parti- 
ally independent assessment of the political environment in which 
House acted. And that is what I have tried to do in my book. I 
have chosen to study House's conduct in a number of situations 
leading up to and during the Peace Conference, and these situations 
have been selected primarily because they tell us something about 
House. Apart from this, I have, as far as possible, described the 
situation independently of House. In  other words, the method is 
not really biographical, but an attempt at combining, or, perhaps, 
rather, compromising between an analysis of American policy at  
the Peace Conference and an account of House's part in its formu- 
lation. Such an analysis of House's activities at  the Conference 
seems to point to the fact that his conduct was of such a character 
that, regardless of possible psychological motives on Wilson's part, 
too, a break with the President was practically unavoidable, i.e. 
the scapegoat theory is superfluous. On the other hand, R. S. 
Baker's thesis on the causes and 'timing' of the break appears 
increasingly plausible. 
I t  is clear from the diary that, both personally and politically, 
House was already in opposition to Wilson at the time of his 
departure for Europe in October 1918.48 He was frustrated because 
his real influence on the President appeared to be waning (partly 
because of Mrs. Wilson's p0sition),4~ and he at the same time felt 
himself to stand considerably more to the Left of the political 
spectrum than Wilson.5o Furthermore, before the commencement of 
the Conference he had had a number of experiences that were to 
have a decisive influence on his conduct during the Conference itself. 
Both in the so-called House Mission in the autumn of 1917 and 
during the pre-Armistice negotiations in 1918, House had been 
the chief negotiator on the American side, with very wide powers 
invested in him. At these two conferences, though perhaps p i n -  
cipally the former, House had obtained insight into how a big inter- 
Allied meeting was organized and manipulated, and he had 
acquired a taste for being the man who made the decisi0ns.5~ 
Another important factor relating to these two conferences was 
that House here came into contact with Clemenceau lor the first 
time, and was undoubtedly highly influenced by this strong per- 
~ o n a l i t y . ~ ~  This in turn had the effect of leading him to favor the 
French views on a number of points, whereby at the Peace Con- 
ference he came to take steps that neither his position as an Ameri- 
can nor his standing as a Liberal could ever warrant. Me became 
disloyal to Wilson and to American policy, partly through his 
own personal attraction to Clemenceau, partly through the feeling 
of superiority engendered in him by his earlier conference experi- 
ence, and partly through the frustration born of his increasingly 
precarious personal relations with the President. On the other hand, 
the original difference in political interests between Wilson and 
himself does not appear to have played a significant part in the 
course of events. On the contrary, in the situations in which House 
acted in a definitely illoyal manner, he stood clearly to the Right, 
not to the Left, of the P r e ~ i d e n t . ~ ~  
The pre-Armistice negotiations provided the last opportunity for 
House to act completely independently, and they reveal quite 
clearly his obvious weaknesses as a negotiator. He seems totally 
to have underestimated the political consequences of the negoti- 
ations and to have accepted formal rather than real concessions. 
On  the other hand, it is clear that he was acting under double 
pressure, partly from the Allies in Paris and partly from the Presi- 
dent in Washington, and there is no doubt that both during the 
negotiations themselves and in the subsequent period, House was 
very uncertain as to the President's intentions. He simply did not 
know what Wilson wanted.54 
However, it was not only the President's policy of which House 
was uncertain in this period, but also his own position. He would 
obviously be given a formally prominent place in the American 
Delegation, but the question was how much real influence he would 
have. Even before the end of the war an internal struggle for power 
had been played out between House and Lansing on the dominant 
role in the coming American Peace Delegation. In  the period up 
to Wilson's arrival in Paris at the beginning of December 1918, 
the second phase of this struggle took place, ending, after a first 
serious setback, in the most favorable result for House. He apparent- 
ly re-established his position with the President and at the same 
time ensured himself a solid position of personal power by building 
up his own organization within the D e l e g a t i ~ n . ~ ~  However, this 
was also the beginning of the end. He became so absorbed in 
consolidating his own key position not only in the American 
Delegation, but also in respect of the Conference as a whole, that 
he failed to keep himself au courant with Wilson's policy. He never 
succeeded in regaining the awareness of the President's innermost 
thoughts that he had apparently lost during the pre-Armistice 
negotiations. I n  addition, he fell ill during the decisive political 
maneouvres before the Peace Conference opened, and he thereby 
lost the influence that he had hoped to exercise.56 
When Wilson left the Conference in the middle of February 1919 
for a short visit to the United States, House threw himself into 
restless action to regain lost ground, but he seems to a certain extent 
to have lost touch with the realities of the situation. He saw him- 
self in the role of grand manipulator of the Conference and forgot 
that his primary task was to act as mouthpiece for American policy. 
There can be no doubt at all that during this period, House acted 
in clear contradiction of Wilson's intentions, both as regards the 
League of Nations and as regards the French demands in respect 
of the Rhineland; he failed to counter the efforts that were once 
more being made to separate the League of Nations Covenant 
from the Peace Treaty, and he allowed himself to become very 
heavily involved in negotiations on a compromise on the French 
demands.57 
The consequence of House's attitude here was a prior weakening 
of JiVilson's bargaining position, a weakening that was further 
accentuated by the domestic developments in the United States, 
where Wilson was encountering heavy opposition to his League of 
Nations policy. Indeed, all indications point to the fact that the 
close personal relationship between House and Wilson came to 
an abrupt and definite end as soon as the President returned to 
France, the 'break' evidently taking place during the very first 
talk between the two men. Wilson here apparently learned enough 
about the events of the previous month to feel that House had failed 
him, while House, for his part, would have liked an opportunity to 
explain matters in detail. This opportunity was never granted to 
him; from now on, as clearly shown by a detailed analysis of Ameri- 
can policy in the subsequent period, he was left out in the 
After the return of the President in mid-March 1919 House was 
without any real influence upon American policy-making. He was, 
in fact, as much in the dark regarding Wilson's thoughts and inten- 
tions as his three fellow-Commissioners; although, thanks to his 
connections in the French and British Delegations and his contacts 
with the American Experts, he was better informed of the work of 
the Conference as a whole than were Lansing, White and Bliss.59 
There is no reason to attribute the break itself to exterior intrigues, 
although there is no doubt that even before Wilson left Paris in 
February, House was in a rather isolated position in the Delegation. 
His energetic efforts to gather all power in his own hands seem to 
have had a marked effect on the working climate in The American 
Commission to Negotiate Peace, and House's fellow-Commissioners, 
in particular, felt both frustrated and bitter. The most influential 
group in the Delegation, apart from House, appears to have been 
the economic experts, severaI of whom (Bernard Baruch, Vance 
McCormick) were already personal friends of the President. How- 
ever, it is not possible to prove that any intrigues on their part or 
on that of others contributed to the break itself. As long as House 
enjoyed Wilson's trust he was unassailable. On the other hand, it 
is naturally possible that after his talk with House in March, TVilson 
became more heedful of information that may have helped to 
deepen the cleft. All the same, this is pure hypo the~ i s .~~  
However, it can be ascertained that for a short time during the 
height of the crisis of the Conference at the beginning of April, 
House was once more taken into favor. Again he failed; it was not 
his policy of concessions in the negotiations on reparations during 
Wilson's illness that proved decisive -here he was only continuing 
a policy already initiated by the President -but once more his pro- 
French policy, this time on the question of the Saar. I n  this serious 
crisis Wilson deliberately chose to stand firm on this question, he 
wanted-at least for a time-to demonstrate the strength of his 
principles, and this, House did not understand. A not insignificant 
part in the course of these events was also played by Gordon 
Auchincloss, House's son-in-law, and Wickham Steed of The Times. 
The explosion took place on 4 ApriLel 
After this House's role was, in fact, played out. I t  is true that he 
was later involved in the negotiations on a compromise with Italy, 
but this was apparently mostly on his own initiative. House's con- 
duct during the Italian negotiations finally exposed his total isola- 
tion in the Delegation, but it did not appear to affect his personal 
relationship with the President; that, as Eouse was only too aware, 
had already been broken.62 On the other hand, several members of 
the American Delegation, especially House's fellow-Commissioners 
Lansing, White and Bliss, were still under the illusion that House 
was a person of influence. They, therefore, made him responsible 
for the solution of the Shantung-question although it was actually 
Wilson himself who had decided on this against the wishes of 
nearly all other members of the American Delegation. House was 
almost the only one who understood -and approved -the decision, 
but his advice was not sought by the P r e ~ i d e n t . ~ ~  Incidentally, dur- 
ing the last phase of the Conference House seems to have de- 
voted himself increasingly to building up the League of Nations. 
Besides having a truly idealistic interest in the concept of the League 
he saw, in the possibility of a prominent post within this organi- 
zation, a consolation for the position he had lost with the President. 
But here, too, he was d i~appo in t ed .~~  
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